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FAMILY LAW
ROGER J.GOEBEL

THIS year was one of quiet evolution rather than of substantial
progress in the area of family law. The event having the greatest
effect on the average citizen was undoubtedly the raising of the
marriage license fee in New York City to three dollars.' The most
noteworthy of the other minor legislative changes were an egalitarian
enactment forbidding wives from contracting to abrogate their duty
of support of incapacitated husbands2 and an authorization of resident
parole centers for paroled juvenile delinquents whose home life is
3

inadequate .

I
MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS

Annulment.-The most novel decision this year was Seagriff v.

Seagriff,4 which held that the open man and wife relations of petitioner
and respondent from 1921 to 1957 did not constitute a valid common
law marriage. Petitioner had been married to a man who had divorced
her in 1928, and the court held that she could not thereafter have
entered into a valid marriage without prior court authorization. This
is clearly the law for subsequent ceremonial marriages, 5 but the
essence of a common law marital relation is the absence of legal
formalities. This makes it a rather harsh and anomalous legalism
to require a court order before entrance into an unceremonial marriage I
Contested annulments for fraud continue to bring reports of
unsavory facts and dubious testimony. Tacchi v. Tacchi6 presented a
classic situation of a "shotgun marriage" between a soldier stationed
in North Carolina and his teen-age girl friend. When he subsequently
discovered that his bride was not below the age of consent and the
baby by blood tests could not be his, a sympathetic court granted him
relief. The questionable character of testimony offered by a spouse in
an uncontested annulment action is checked by the statutory requireRoger J. Goebel is a Ford Fellow in Comparative Law at the New York University
School of Law.
I N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 15 (Supp. 1960).
2 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 51 (Supp. 1960).
3 N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 440 (Supp. 1960).
4 21 Misc. 2d 604, 195 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1960). Cf.
Upton v. Upton, 21 Misc. 2d 818, 195 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1959)
(same result achieved following Pennsylvania law).
5 Cf. Matter of Estate of D'Alessio, 196 Misc. 759, 92 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Surr. Ct.,
Bronx Co. 1949).
6 195 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1959).
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ment of corroboration. 7 This limitation is especially salutary in actions
based on breach of an alleged premarital agreement to have children.'
In another case, the first department, while holding that the doctrine
of unclean hands (here in the form of premarital intercourse) would
not prevent an annulment for fraudulent allegation of pregnancy,
remanded for a new trial in view of the unsatisfactory character of
the testimony. 9
Separation and Divorce.-The reported actions for legal separation are primarily distinguished by the picayune, almost neurotic,
nature of the complaints. One wife's bill of particulars included the
refusal of her husband to take her home from a party or to get a
baby sitter; 10 another complained of interference by her father-in-law,
since deceased;" a third wife continued cohabiting with her allegedly
inhumane spouse, "strangely manifesting her estrangement to the
extent of wanting her back scrubbed in the bathtub."' 2 These flimsy
complaints, reflecting our society's increasingly romantic idea of
marriage as a "sometime thing," were deservedly rejected. Incompatibility of temperament, discoverable before marriage, continues-and
3
properly-to be no ground for separation.1
In Ziegler v. Ziegler,4 W left H in January 1958, pending a trial
of her action for separation on grounds of cruelty. This 1958 trial
ended adversely to W and the court incidentally found-though the
matter was not at issue-that W's leaving of H was without just cause.
In the instant action, both W and H sued for separation on grounds of
abandonment, and the trial court found for H, citing the prior court's
finding of fact. The first department treated the decision as a trial
court finding of fact and affirmed. But as the dissent properly points
out, the crucial issue was whether W's leaving of H pending a trial
was justified. The trial court holding of abandonment was based on the
res judicata effect of the prior trial finding. Since an incidental finding
of fact not in issue is not res judicata, this should have been held
reversible error."
7 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1143.
8 Cf. Roger v. Roger, 198 N.Y.S.2d 657 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1960); Rausen v.
Rausen, 187 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1959).
9 Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 9 App. Div. 2d 98, 191 N.Y.S.2d 574 (per curiam), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 625, 197 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1st Dep't 1959).
10 Anderson v. Anderson, 16 Misc. 2d 713, 189 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1959).
11 Mannes v. Mannes, 187 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct., Suffolg Co. 1959).
12 Duffy v. Duffy, 23 Misc. 2d 266, 267, 200 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1960).
13 McClinton v. McClinton, 200 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1960).
14 10 App. Div. 2d 270, 198 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1960) (mem.).
1t Cf. Karameros v. Luther, 279 N.Y. 87, 17 N.E.2d 779 (1938); Silberstein v.
Silberstein, 218 N.Y. 525, 113 N.E. 495 (1916).
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Cornell v. Cornell" poses a nice problem in divorce law, but its
resolution should have minor practical effect. A final divorce decree
can only be entered three months after an interlocutory order. Since
17
1946, the final decree is entered as a matter of course by the court,
but, prior to 1946, the final decree was obtained only on further
motion by the plaintiff. In Matter of Crandall,"'decided in 1909, the
Court of Appeals held that where plaintiff died a few months after the
interlocutory order without moving for a final decree, a nunc pro tunc
order granting the final decree as of plaintiff's death could not be
entered. In Cornell, W secured an interlocutory order of divorce from
H-1 in 1915, but never moved for a final decree. W remarried in 1930,
but H-1 lived until 1938. To claim her widow's share upon the death of
1-2, W sought a nunc pro tune order entering the final decree as of
1915. The Court of Appeals, reversing the third department, granted
this relief. Judge Van Voorhis reasoned that the substantive issue of
the divorce had been resolved in the interlocutory order and the entry
of the final decree was only a ministerial act, the omission of which
could be, remedied nunc pro tunc.
The policy of the decision accords with the present statutory
regime, and similar cases are unlikely to occur. But the opinion is
not without flaw. Although overruling Crandall in part, the court
would apparently continue to hold that an omitted final decree could
not be entered nunc pro tune if one of the parties dies before the three
months have elapsed, or if it is the defendant who is seeking the
relief to validate a second marriage. 9 Accordingly, an omitted pre1946 final decree is not always to be deemed as entered of course, but
only if the plaintiff wishes so to treat it. One wonders what the result
would have been had the plaintiff in the instant case wished to disavow
her marriage to H-2 in order to claim as the widow of H-1. Would the
omission of the 1915 final decree then have been deemed ministerial
error or a deliberate substantive choice?
That the law on a related point has not changed is indicated by
Newins v. Newins.2 ° There a final divorce decree had been entered
against H in 1936, but without any express prohibition against
remarriage. H could therefore remarry provided he secured court
16 7 N.Y.2d

164, 164 N.E.2d 395, 196 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1959).
17 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1176. It need hardly be said that a purported remarriage
of a party within the three months between the interlocutory order and the final
decree is utterly void. Hess v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 9 App. Div. 2d 585,
189 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dep't 1959) (mem.).
18 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578 (1909).
19 Cornell v. Cornell, 7 N.Y.2d 164, 167, 164 N.E.2d 395, 398, 196 N.Y.S.2d 98,
102 (1959).
20 10 App. Div. 2d 856, 199 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dep't 1960) (mere.).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

FAMILY LAW

December 1960]

permission." H remarried in 1959, and shortly thereafter died. W-2's
application for a nunc pro tunc order granting H permission to remarry
was denied on the authority of Merrick v. Merrick2 Court permission
to a divorced defendant to remarry thus remains a substantive, not
a ministerial, act and its omission cannot be remedied nunc pro tune.
Jurisdiction:Validity of Foreign Decrees.-The Court of Appeals
came to the obvious conclusion that there is continuing jurisdiction
over a presently nonresident defendant to collect arrearages under a
New York support order.23 The issue was clouded only because of
some confusion over the propriety of service on defendant's former
attorney, but the court found that defendant had in fact appeared by
authorized counsel.
A neat problem was posed by Detzel v. Detzel:24 What is the
jurisdictional basis for an attack on an annulment procured by a nowdeceased nonresident spouse? There can no longer be any personal
jurisdiction; decedent left no estate in New York, and the marital
status in theory never existed. In what appears to be a case of first
impression,2" the court reasoned that some element of the former
marital status subsisted as a res in the guise of a judgment on the
records, which can be corrected if erroneous. The decision seems sound
in policy if awkward conceptually-an analogy may be seen in the
statutory scheme of support permitted to an ex-spouse after the
marriage has been annulled. 6
The sufficiency of the residence period used by a plaintiff in foreign
ex parte divorces was successfully attacked in several cases.27 In one,
Camp v. Camp, 8 H admittedly was now a Florida domiciliary but the
court held that he had not satisfied the Florida six-month residence
requirement. H contended that even so the Florida decree should
enjoy full faith and credit, but the court correctly observed that since
collateral attack on residence was possible in Florida, New York
could also collaterally attack the decree. Having established the
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 8 (1957).
2 266 N.Y. 120, 194, N.E. 55 (1934).
23 Haskell v. Haskell, 6 N.Y.2d 79, 160 N.E.2d 33, 188 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1959).
24 22 Misc. 2d 76, 190 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1959).
25 Compare Dye v. Dye, 93 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct., Chautauqua Co. 1949),
where an annulment from a deceased spouse was vacated, but the spouse died resident
in New York and left an estate here.
26 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1140-a.
2T Schepens v. Schepens, 8 App. Div. 2d 856, 190 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1959)
(mem.); Mincy v. Mincy, 20 Misc. 2d 1035, 189 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1959); Camp v. Camp, 21 Misc. 2d 903, 189 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
21

1959).

28 Supra note 27.
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invalidity of the foreign divorce, the court awarded a separation to
W.
A decided distinction now exists in New York between the respect
accorded to Mexican divorces and that accorded to those of other
states. The Court of Appeals' affirmance without opinion of Alfaro v.
Alfaro29 means that an ex parte Mexican divorce can now be challenged
even by the spouse who obtained it. The same challenge would be
barred by estoppel if the decree were of a sister state." The second
department extended the Alfaro rule to enable challenge of a Mexican
decree, even if one spouse appeared in person and the other by
attorney.3 ' In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Boxer v. Boxer,"'
again without opinion, affirmed a holding that full faith and credit
barred such a challenge by the spouse who appeared by attorney if
the sister state rendering the decree would not allow such collateral
attack. A third-party attack, as by a second spouse of one of the
parties, is not possible against a sister state's decree (unless the
sister state itself permits such attack), 3 but apparently is possible
against a Mexican decree.3 4 Of course, a spouse who appears by
attorney may always subsequently attack the validity of the authorization of such appearance, with respect to both sister state and Mexican
decrees. 5 The only practical result of all this is to further complicate
our already over-complicated conflict of laws rules, and to spur
parties who wish "quickie" or collusive divorces to secure them in
Nevada or Alabama rather than in Mexico.
II
ALIMONY

Alimony.-The search continues for elusive "objective criteria"
to determine the size of alimony awards amid "the present miasma of
29 7 N.Y.2d 949, 165 N.E.2d 880, 198 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1960) (mem.), affirming 5
App. Div. 2d 770, 169 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.). For extended comment,
see Grad, Conflict of Laws, supra pp. 1406-08.
30 Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
31 Heine v. Heine, 10 App. Div. 2d 864, 199 N.Y.S.2d 788 (mem.), modified and
motion for leave to appeal denied mem., 10 App. Div. 2d 967, 202 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d
Dep't 1960).
32 7
N.Y.2d 781, 163 N.E.2d 149, 194 N.Y.S.2d 47 (mem.), affirming 7
App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.). The Boxer holding is
required by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
33 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), followed in Nitschke v. Nitschke,
21 Misc. 2d 632, 195 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1959).
34 See Weiler v. Weiler, 23 Misc. 2d 248, 201 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co.

1960).

35 See Towers v. Towers, 201 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1960) (Alabama
decree); Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 20 Misc. 2d 248, 192 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1959) (Mexican decree).
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perjury, acrimony and hyperbole, which now envelops almost every
alimony application." 36 The needs of the wife and the means of the
husband provide the initial framework for the award, but the frequent
reversals by the appellate division show the lack of precision this
37
standard affords, even in relatively uncomplicated fact patterns.
The wife's independent means are a major factor in the equation,
whether the husband's means be limited" or substantial. 9 An award
will also be properly limited by the husband's new familial obligations. 0
On the other hand, the prior support status of the wife is significant,
and the free-spending husband who supported his wife for years in
"lush housewifery" may find his liability proportionately higher. 4 '
This approach in one recent case helped produce the extraordinary
result that the entire $50 a week income of the husband was awarded
as alimony! 42 The result becomes understandable only with the
knowledge that the couple had run through $750,000 in the preceding
eight years, and the husband, as heir to a large fortune, could rely on
his mother's aid.
A complicating factor in the determination of alimony is the
varying extent and often confused basis of the use of examinations
before trial as to the husband's finances. A lucid opinion in Hunter v.
Hunter" has set forth the standards to prevail in the first department.
No examination before trial will be permitted if the right to support is
contested or undetermined. Even when the only issue is the extent
of support, an examination will be allowed only if (1) there is a
genuine dispute as to the preseparation earnings of the husband and
level of support of the wife; or (2) the husband's income is modest,
and there is a dispute as to his postseparation ability to support the
wife; or (3) in a rare case, where the wife is entitled to share in the
progressive postseparation increase in the husband's earnings.
The second department last year seemingly suggested that it
36 Larkin v. Larkin, 19 Misc. 2d 172, 176, 138 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1959) (Hofstadter, J.).
37 See, e.g., Kane v. Kane, 10 App. Div. 2d 888, 201 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dep't 1960)
(mem.); Burrowes v. Burrowes, 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1st Dep't
1960) (mem.); Plancher v. Plancher, 9 App. Div. 2d 787, 193 N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't
1959) (mem.).
3S Brant v. Brant, 23 Misc. 2d 646, 200 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1960).
39 Rosen v. Rosen, 18 Misc. 2d 257, 193 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1959),
aff'd mer., 10 App. Div. 2d 818, 199 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dep't 1960).
40 Larkin v. Larkin, 19 Misc. 2d 172, 188 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1959).
41 Snyder v. Snyder, 196 N.Y.S.2d 421, 426 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1959).
42 Vought v. Vought, 22 Misc. 2d 356, 195 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1959).
43 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 193 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1960).
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would be more liberal in allowing such examinations, though it still
refuses them when support is contested.44 But, as a supreme court
decision in the third department indicates, that department and the
fourth department will allow the examinations, even when the merits
of the separation or divorce action are also contested.4 A uniform
and more liberal rule for all the departments to resolve this unnecessary confusion is long overdue.
Temporary Alimony and Counsel Fees: Enforcement Proceedings.
-May counsel for a wife sue the husband directly for counsel fees
for his successful prosecution of a matrimonial action? The first
department felt constrained by a 1912 precedent to hold that he may.40
The decision appears erroneous. As Justice Valente, dissenting, and
the lower court both indicate, subsequent decisions would appear to
have long since eliminated the need for such an action. As a matter of
sound policy, the provisions in Civil Practice Act Sections 1169 and
1170, giving the court which decided the matrimonial action power
to award counsel fees, should be regarded as exclusive.
Snow v. Snow47 poses an interesting question. A separation judgment called for a lump sum award in three installments. H died after
paying the first installment, and W sued his estate for the balance.
The second department denied recovery on the ground that such an
award is modifiable until reduced to a final judgment under Civil
Practice Act Section 1171-b and, hence, cannot be recovered in an
action at law for an amount certain. The dissent argued that section
1171-b was never intended to make the theoretical modifiability of
such an award a bar to this type of independent plenary action.
III
CHILDREN

Custody.-The use of confidential reports of psychologists and
welfare workers by trial courts is giving rise to manifest appellate
concern. In three cases the appellate division reversed for failure to
allow proper controversion by counsel of such secret reports. 48 The
44 Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1959)
(mem.).
45 Berlin v. Berlin, 17 Misc. 2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co.
1959).

46 Gallin v. Stafford, 10 App. Div. 2d 915, 200 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1st Dep't 1960)
(mem.), reversing 18 Misc. 2d 786, 188 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. City Ct. 1959), on the
authority of Horn v. Scbmalholz, 150 App. Div. 333, 134 N.Y. Supp. 652 (2d Dep't
1912).
47 8 App. Div. 2d 516, 190 N.Y.S.2d 902 (2d Dep't 1959).
48 People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufman, 9 App. Div. 2d 375, 193 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Ist

Dep't 1959); Herb v. Herb, 8 App. Div. 2d 419, 188 N.Y.S.2d 41 (4th Dep't 1959)
(per curiam); People ex rel. Schlanger v. Schlanger, 8 App. Div. 2d 801, 187 N.Y.S.2d
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fourth department held that counsel for both parties could not even
stipulate their consent to the use by the court of such confidential
reports in formulating its decision. 9 However, the first department
intimated that such a stipulation would be appropriate, and noted
that in any event information from confidential reports could be used
in the court's investigation, though not in its decision."
In custody awards, the most encouraging development is an
increasing respect for comity. Lang v. Lang5' may be applauded as
the soundest exercise of judicial discretion of the year. The mother
had, in violation of a Swiss custody decree, taken the two children to
New York. The father commenced proceedings for their return, and
then, violating a New York temporary order, spirited one of the
children back to Switzerland. Exercising judicious self-restraint, the
court overlooked this contumacious behavior to give comity its due
by returning the other child to the father in accordance with the
decree of the domiciliary Swiss court. Almost simultaneously, a trial
court in another case was ordering the return of two children to their
father in Cuba in accord with the domiciliary Cuban court award. 52
Support.-The Court of Appeals split four-to-three on a question
of legislative construction in Department of Welfare v. Siebel. 3 Chief
Judge Conway for the majority construed several provisions of the
Domestic Relations Court Act to warrant charging a stepmother with
part of the bill to maintain her stepson at an institution for juvenile
delinquents when the natural father was unable to pay the entire bill.
Judge Fuld, in dissent, vigorously urged that the liability of a stepparent was purely secondary, so that no charge could be made while
the natural parent paid part of the bill. Meanwhile, the fourth
department held that the surrogate's court had neither statutory nor
common law power to order reimbursement of the public welfare officer
out of a juvenile delinquent's own estate. 4
Adoptions.-The best news this year was an excellent article
921 (1st Dep't 1959) (mem.). See also Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 App. Div. 2d 935,
201 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1960) (mem.) (lower court affirmed only because of other
evidence in the record).
49 Herb v. Herb, supra note 48.
GOPeople ex rel. Fields v. Kaufman, 9 App. Div. 2d 375, 378, 193 N.Y.S.2d 789,
792-93 (1st Dep't 1959) (dictum).
51 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd mem., 7
N.X.2d 1029, 166 N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960). See Grad, Conflict of Laws,
supra pp. 1409-10.
52 Pelaez v. Maxwell, 23 Misc. 2d 423, 198 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co.
1960).
53 6 N.Y. 2d 536, 161 N.E.2d 1, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361
U.S. 535 (1960).
54 Matter of Brodine, 10 App. Div. 2d 414, 200 N.Y.S.2d 199 (4th Dep't 1960).
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co-authored by Justice Hofstadter and an attorney, Miss Shirley
Levittan, pinpointing respects in which the law fails to give sufficient
attention to the welfare of the child. Specifically they urged two
reforms: (1) all private placement tending toward private adoptions
(65% of the total in New York) should be supervised from the start
by the court or other official agency; (2) comprehensive statutory
modes of terminating parental rights when necessary prior to and
apart from adoption should be established. 5
One rare mode of abrogating parental rights was used this year.
A felon who loses his civil rights is not entitled to withhold his consent
or even to receive notice of the adoption of his children. 6 But not every
felon is totally indifferent to his children, and, at least in theory, one
sentenced to a short term (three years in the noted case) is intended
to be rehabilitated. This sweeping statute is a piece of anachronistic
penal legislation that needs updating.
Parent-Child Suits.-Further erosion of outdated immunities in
tort continues. One progressive supreme court held that a father may
sue his own minor son derivatively for loss of services and medical
injuries sustained where the negligent driving of such son injured
another minor son." Another held that a child, though barred from
suing a parent for normal negligence, may sue for the wanton negligence of driving while drunk."8 In the contract field, a suit to recover
money expended in the education and promotion of child actor Eddie
Hodges (of "Music Man" fame) failed because brought by a partnership, one of whose members was Eddie's father. 59 The court indicated
that a suit in quasi-contract by the unrelated promoter himself would
be allowed, since such training and promotion could be considered
a "necessary" for such a precocious child's education.
5 Hofstadter & Levittan, A Study in Adoption-Initial Investigation and Termination of Parental Rights (pts. 1-7), 142 N.Y.L.J. Nos. 58-64, p. 4, col. 1 (Sept. 21-25,
28-29, 1959).
56 Matter of Anonymous, 17 Misc. 2d 691, 187 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Surr. Ct., Nassau
Co. 1959); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 (Supp. 1960).
57 Becker v. Rieck, 19 Misc. 2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co.
1959), 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1209 (1960).
58 Decker v. Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct., Herkimer Co.
1959).
59 Siegel & Hodges v. Hodges, 20 Misc. 2d 243, 191 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct., Queens
Co. 1959), aff'd mem., 10 App. Div. 2d 646, 197 N.Y.S.2d 246 (2d Dep't 1960).
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